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In On the People’s Terms, Philip Pettit incorporates the Sieyèsian notion of 
constituent power into his constitutional theory of non-domination. In this 
paper, I argue that Emmanuel Sieyès’s understanding of liberty precludes such 
an appropriation. While a republican, his conceptualisation of liberty in the face 
of commercial society stood apart from theories of civic vigilance, preferring 
instead to disentangle individuals from politics and maximise what he 
understood to be their non-political freedoms. Sieyès saw that liberty was 
heightened through relations of representation and commercial dependency. 
This conception of liberty was pivotal to the identity of the nation, and so 
allowed Sieyès to assess forms of collective injustice committed by the French 
nobility. It also provided the normative foundation to his theory of constituent 
power. For Sieyès, constituent power guarded against legislative excess in a 
decidedly minimal sense, intending instead to separate citizens from the political 
sphere so they were not burdened with ongoing participation or public vigilance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Neo-republicans associate liberty with non-domination (Pettit 1997; 
Skinner 1998).1  For Philip Pettit, domination arises when one party has the 
capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis, and with impunity, with the choices 
of another (Pettit 1997:22). In his most recent work on the subject, On the People’s 
Terms, Pettit has sought to account for the democratic institutions associated 
with this understanding of liberty. Here, he identifies republican liberty with the 
Sieyèsian notion of constituent power (Pettit 2012:285-292). In this paper, I 
argue that Sieyès’s understanding of liberty precludes a straightforward 
incorporation of constituent power into a constitutional theory of non-
domination. While a republican, Sieyès was an idiosyncratic one; his 
conceptualisation of liberty in the face of commercial society stood apart from 
theories of civic vigilance, preferring instead to disentangle individuals from 
politics and maximise what he took to be their non-political freedoms.  
Pettit’s republican constitutionalism, while analytical in scope, is 
grounded and enriched by a highly stylised historical excavation of republicanism 
(1997:17-51; 2012:5-25; 2013). 2  Pettit celebrates what he labels the Italian-
Atlantic tradition, inherited from classical Rome, which emphasised the freedom 
from the domination of a master. Rediscovered in Renaissance Italy, it sparked 
the English Civil War and enflamed the American Revolution (Pettit 2012:2). 
Liberty was secured through the constitutional constraints of the mixed 
constitution, and an understanding of civic virtue to vigilantly track public policy. 
Pettit contrasts the Italian-Atlantic tradition with a ‘continental’ variant of 
republicanism rooted in the Rousseauvian transformations of the 18th century. 
While this ‘continental’ tradition maintained the ideal of non-domination, it did 
so by abandoning the mixed constitution in favour of a popular absolutism 
through which the free person was equated with a politically active participant 
(Pettit 2012:18; 2013). Pettit’s history of republicanism has inevitably found itself 
a target for criticism (McCormick 2003; Nelson 2004; Ghosh 2008). This paper 
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extends this perspective through a reading of the republicanism of Emmanuel 
Sieyès, who further unsettles Pettit’s dualist history of republicanism.  
I do so by excavating Sieyès’s own formulation of republican liberty. 
After situating Pettit’s interpretation of Sieyès within the existing scholarship, I 
argue that that Sieyès developed an account of liberty that sought to challenge a 
brand of aristocratic French republicanism indebted to the English 
Commonwealth tradition. The thése nobiliaire entrenched the power and status of 
the nobility under the guise of protection against monarchical absolutism. 
Against this, Sieyès developed an argument for liberty that celebrated the 
dependency generated by commercial society. His proposal hung on a 
distinction between liberty of independence and liberty of empowerment. This 
provided a normative justification for the commercial division of labour and for 
a practice of social representation and sought to sharpen the benefits one 
received when dependent on others. This interpretation is developed in the 
second section. In the third section, I show how his presentation of liberty 
patterned his revolutionary constitutional theory, notably, the normative 
ordering of the nation. Here, Sieyès identified a set of interactions between the 
symbiotic dependency within the Third Estate, the parasitic dependency of the 
noble order on the nation, and the feudal domination of the noble order over 
the rural peasantry. While guarding against the most pernicious forms of 
domination enacted by the remnants of feudalism, Sieyès prioritised the gains to 
liberty produced by commercial society, improving the efficiency, quality and 
choice presented to individuals.  These distinctions provided one set of 
normative foundations of his version of republican constitutionalism.  
In the final section, I argue that this contrasts in a critical way with 
Pettit’s republican constitutionalism. While Pettit does recognise the importance 
of trust and mutual dependence to public life (1997:262-270), he differs from 
Sieyès with respect to the normative ordering of dependence within their 
respective conceptions of liberty. This had political implications: the centrality 
Sieyès ascribes to liberty of empowerment alters the grounds on which political 
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representation is operationalised, tempering the mechanism of public 
responsiveness that is key to Pettit’s vigilant tracking of trust. If constituent 
power was to guard against legislative excess, it did so in a decidedly minimal 
sense: for Sieyès, representation and constituent power were each mechanisms 
to separate citizens from the political sphere so they were not burdened with 
ongoing participation or public vigilance. This should be seen as a problem for 
any attempt to incorporate Sieyès into a constitutionalism of non-domination. 
SIEYÈS AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY 
The place of liberty in the constitutional thought of the Abbe Sieyès is 
routinely marginalised. This is, in part, because much effort has been invested in 
tracing the intellectual ancestry of his contributions to the theory of sovereignty, 
often with the broader aim of identifying the intellectual origins of the French 
Revolution. This can be seen in the resurgence of Sieyès among interwar legal 
theorists, namely Raymond Carré de Malberg (1922) and Carl Schmitt (2008) for 
whom the Sieyésian nation took on the gloss of a Rousseauvian general will. 
Arendt, too, succumbed to this reading when, in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1967:231), she associated the constituent power of the nation with a 
‘pseudomystical aura of lawless arbitrariness’ that eroded the freedom of the 
people. For these interpreters, constituent power was understood to be 
interchangeable with unbridled popular sovereignty, and for Hannah Arendt the 
Terror was evidence of this interpretation.3 
This presentation of Sieyès has come under scrutiny by those who have 
emphasise the centrality of representation to Sieyès’s constitutional theory 
(Baczko 1988; Baker 1990; Forsyth 1987; Sonenscher 2003). Istvan Hont’s 
pathbreaking work, for instance, proposed that Sieyès’s debt was to Thomas 
Hobbes, whose notion of union through artificial representation stood behind 
the Sieyèsian nation, laying the foundations for the modern state-form (Hont 
2005:486). Hont’s intervention appropriately restored individual liberty to 
Sieyèsian constitutionalism against the impositions of an exaggerated 
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decisionism. Others have emphasised the liberal constitutionalism that followed 
from this, whereby the representative form of the constituent power served as a 
limit upon the authority of the constituted powers, thereby guaranteeing the 
rights of man. This stance remains common within the French literature where 
his distinctiveness from Rousseau has been long argued (Clavreul 1987; 
Guilhaumou 1997:18-23; Pasquino 1998; Tyrsenko 2000:29-31; Fauré 2008).4 
However, while the importance of individual liberty is recognised, its 
composition is left undertheorised. It is a mistake to envisage Sieyès’s 
understanding of liberty as something secondary to his styling of the nation. I 
argue that the two are profoundly connected, and that his reworking of 
republican liberty provides the normative anchor to his constitutionalism and 
his account of representation.  
This is not to argue that his conception of liberty has been neglected 
wholesale. However, those that have elaborated his conception of liberty have 
subsumed him into orthodox republicanism, or early liberalism. Egon Zweig, 
now over a century ago, argued that his account of freedom was the key to 
understanding the anti-Rousseauvian dimension of Sieyès’s thought. Zweig 
emphasised Sieyès’s authorship of the Déclaration, presenting citizens as rights 
bearers for whom freedom met its limits only upon harming the freedom of 
others (Zweig 1909:127).5 This presentation collapses Sieyès into negative liberty 
in the Berlinian form of non-interference.  Elsewhere, Pasquale Pasquino has 
alluded to the Sieyèsian roots of Benjamin Constant’s distinction between 
ancient and modern liberty, contending that the individualism of modern liberty 
followed from Sieyès’s representative government (Pasquino 1987:214-15; see 
also Guilhaumou 1997; Sewell 1994:101-2). 
If these views emphasise Sieyès’s liberalism, others present Sieyès’s 
understanding of freedom in a more directly republican vein, for while liberty 
was understood in terms of individual freedom, it took the republican form of 
non-domination. As Rubinelli (2019.a:52) presents it, non-domination figured in 
Sieyès’s constitutional theory as consent to the laws that are made. Rubinelli does 
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appreciate that Sieyès’s account of liberty is double-faced, consisting also of the 
freedom granted to individuals through the division of labour. She argues that 
constituent power was a constitutional device to reconcile this dualist 
understanding of liberty, in contrast to the dominium of sovereignty. While 
constituent power took the form of the authority of the people to constitute the 
state, consistent with the first component of liberty, this was to be executed by 
extraordinary representatives, consistent with the second component (Rubinelli 
2019.a:53-54). I maintain that these modes of liberty were not complementary 
and compatible, but conflicting, and this required a trade-off. Sieyès 
subordinated the principle of non-domination to the gains of dependency, and 
this amends the normative ordering of the nation and shapes the character of 
Sieyesian republicanism.   
This ordering is important: although Pettit’s elaboration of Sieyès’s place 
as a theorist of republican constitutionalism is brief, with no mention of liberty 
itself,6 he presents constituent power as easily reconcilable with the ideal of 
republican liberty. This entails a ‘dual-aspect’ model of democracy. In the first, 
‘constituent’ aspect, the people appear as a plurality to determine the 
metaprinciples to guide lawmaking. In the second, constituted aspect, the people 
appear as a corporate entity within the bounds set out by the metaprinciples of 
the constitution. In this way, constituent power appears as a regulative principle 
to assess from critical distance the internal function of constitutional decision-
making. As decision-making is guided by the norms devised by a plural 
constituent power, the authority of the constituted people is therefore non-
sovereign, and non-dominating (Pettit 2012:290). Pace Pettit, I argue that under 
Sieyès’s presentation of liberty, constituent power is not to be understood as a 
vigilant check upon a dominating legislature, but rather as means of 
disentangling citizens from the civic process. Antonio Negri (1999:218) has 
argued that this was a fall from grace, transforming a vibrant contestatory 
republicanism into a ‘tortuous combination of representation and government’. 
However, Sieyès did not see the arguments at which he took aim as vibrant or 
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contestatory. Rather, he saw it as a means of entrenching the power and status 
of the nobility. His matrix of liberty open channels for evaluating instances of 
collective injustice in this republican tradition.  
SIEYÈS ON FREEDOM AND DEPENDENCY 
It is tempting to assume that Sieyès was a ‘conventional’ theorist of 
republican liberty. In a note likely written during the Thermidorian Reaction, he 
wrote, ‘no man has the right to dominate another. A free man is he who obeys 
his own will’ (Sieyès 1999.c:474). 7  Such assumption distorts the political 
landscape. The vocabulary of republicanism in the late 18th century was both 
pervasive and deeply variegated (Philp 1998), a quality that Pettit’s stylised 
opposition does not accommodate. This aspect is also lost among traditionalist 
accounts of French republicanism, who treat its development in isolation from 
broader republican currents across Europe (Nicolet 1982; Furet and Ozouf 
1993). This is true neither of Sieyès nor the wider French republican tradition. 
Sieyès read English and had access to an extensive range of works of English 
Commonwealthmen, including Milton, Harrington, Shaftsbury, and 
Bolingbroke (Forsyth 1987:38-40).8 Moreover, recent work has demonstrated 
that the English Commonwealth vocabulary permeated France more deeply 
than was previously assumed (Jainchill 2008; Hammersley 2010).  
One such example was Henri de Boulainvilliers, with whose work Sieyès 
was well acquainted. 9  His aristocratic republicanism argued for a Frankish 
liberty, comprising an original condition of being ‘perfectly equal and 
independent, both in general and as an individual’, a ‘precious liberty’ that had 
been defended against Roman and barbarian invasion, and guarded by the noble 
order as the only legitimate government of the realm (Boulainvilliers 1727:26-
27).10 The ancient form of mixed government stood in contrast to the absolutism 
that had grown out of Roman rule, and Boulainvilliers called for the restoration 
of the former. This was the thèse nobiliaire, which adapted arguments from the 
English commonwealth tradition to the French context. One likely source of 
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this argument was Lord Bolingbroke, a friend of Boulainvilliers who had 
championed the vocabulary of English liberty and communicated it through the 
gothic language of the ancient constitution in the pages of The Craftsman 
(Hammersley 2010:64).  
These arguments had been developed in less aristocratic forms by 
individuals like Gabriel Bonnot de Mably in the mid-18th century, though they 
retained the appeal to ancient liberties threatened by corrupt magistrates and the 
emerging commercial society. 11  Mably’s Des Droit et Des Devoirs du Citoyen, 
organised as a dialogue between a Frenchman and an English 
Commonwealthman, keys us into these arguments. Through the mouthpiece of 
the Englishman Stanhope, Mably presented a commonwealthman’s analysis of 
the British constitution coupled with a cautious suggestion for importation to 
France. For Stanhope, commerce ‘infected’ society with the vices of its 
neighbours (Mably 1972:9). This replaced civic virtue with private interests, the 
remedy for which was the vigilant guardianship of ancient liberty against the 
modern threat of commerce and the court.   
Sieyès was familiar with these arguments of ancient Frankish liberty, and 
he dismissed them offhand in What is the Third Estate? (Sieyès 2003.c:99). Sieyès 
challenged this vocabulary, developing his own idiosyncratic language of 
republicanism more amenable to commercial society. Rather than being 
‘infected’ by the vices of commercial exchange, or being preserved by an ancient 
order of nobles, Sieyès saw liberty as intimately connected with representation 
and enhanced by commerce. Identifying how commercial dependency enabled 
this was vital to a materially inclined assessment of instances of unfreedom.  
Sieyès saw himself as a sociologist (Guilhaumou 2006). Liberty was not 
to be understood in the abstract, but as a manifestation of the material relations 
of society. These material relations were representative. This was clear even in 
his notebooks on metaphysics from the early 1770s, where Sieyès drew attention 
to the relation between liberty and representation. A ‘representative sensation’ 
was the product of a plurality of sensations within a single sense organ: an image 
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or a melody was a representative sensation.  Sieyès’s proof for one’s existence 
lay in the experience of such representative sensations (Sieyès 1999.a:75). The 
body was composed of a plurality of organs each of which experience the world 
differently: one’s feet can be cold, while their head is hot, and these 
representative sensations were to be mediated into a composite form.  The 
immediate reception of representative sensations was passive, but the 
examination and deliberation of them by the will was an active endeavour. 
Individual liberty in its elementary form resided here (Sieyès 1999.a:81). The will 
was thrown into a relation of representation with the sense organs and was free 
to decide how it responded.  
For Sieyès, there was no autonomous will freed from representation. 
Representation was not antithetical to freedom, despite the proclamations of his 
contemporaries.12 Rather, the will’s freedom to decide was heightened because of 
representative relations. The sense organs distilled a plurality of sensations into 
a more readily interpreted representative sensation upon which the will could 
make a judgement. The will’s capacity to make an effective judgement was aided 
by the work initially completed by the sense organs, and so to enact one’s will 
was to take advantage of the assemblage of representative connections within 
the body. Society, for Sieyès, was an extension of this logic.  Just as the human 
body consisted of a plurality of organs that aided the freedom of the will, so too 
was society composed of myriad representative organs that aided individual 
freedom. This was because as a member of society each individual was exposed 
to an ever-greater range of representative sensations (Sieyès 1999.a:77-78). In 
short, one’s freedom was enhanced through their dependence on others in 
society.  
The translation of this corporeal analogy into society was expressed 
clearest in his essay ‘Of the Gains of Liberty in Society and in the Representative 
System’. He explained that the liberty proper to humans was a liberty within 
social relations. Those who assume liberty was possible in isolation mistook 
liberty for mere independence. As humans have needs, and as needs have given 
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rise to society, Sieyès posited, independence alone was insufficient. Sieyès 
distinguished between two frameworks of liberty in society: liberty of 
independence, and liberty of empowerment [liberté de pouvoir]. Of the former, he 
considered a man free ‘when he is not hindered by other men from exercising 
his will’. Sieyès intended this definition to accord with ‘common usage’, and this 
was to be understood in an expansive sense, accommodating both physical and 
psychological conditions of unfreedom (Sieyès 2014.b:145). More precisely, his 
definition corresponded to the ancient liberty of Frenchmen expressed in 
Boulainvilliers’ thèse nobiliaire, although whether he had this in mind when writing 
is unclear: 
‘It is hardly possible to list all those many other conditions, internal no 
less than external, which may render him dependent and even 
oppressed: I am thinking of the innumerable obstacles  that ignorance, 
clumsiness, rain, wind, fire and so on, may pose for his activity or his 
tranquility’ (Sieyès 2014.b:145). 
Sieyès intended to highlight the insufficiencies of an understanding of liberty as 
independence. Individuals were inescapably dependent on the external world, 
and this need not be seen as a hindrance. It was, rather, a form of empowerment. 
Sieyès asked the reader to consider an example: imagine two people caught in a 
thunderstorm. The first picks up a ladder and uses it to climb into the attic of a 
barn. The other ‘in order to avoid dependency on the ladder, remains outside 
shivering and exposed in the thunderstorm’ (Sieyès 2014.b:150). The former, 
empowered by the ladder, was able to pursue their will. The latter, in their desire 
to remain independent, could not.  
Sieyès thought an asocial definition of liberty was impoverished. 13 
Liberty was enhanced by society just as the freedom of the will was enhanced by 
the sense organs, namely, via his characteristically expansive account of 
representation. Through the provision of public works, the quality of liberty was 
improved by augmenting the intellectual and physical powers on the sociable 
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individual (2014.a:122). Sieyès understood social representation as a function of 
the division of labour, which he believed he had diagnosed some years earlier 
than Adam Smith and had taken considerably further (Sewell 1994:89).14 The 
division of labour included all aspects of productive society. Specialist labourers, 
in fulfilling duties that would otherwise fall on individuals, were said to be 
representatives. This model of representative labour was a fundamental indicator 
of freedom (Sieyès 2014.a:122). The act of entrusting others with tasks an 
individual was unable to complete effectively was an elementary feature of a 
society in which individuals were able to maximise their ability to act freely. 
Undertaking these duties oneself placed undue burdens that hindered the 
capacity for the individual to make free choices effectively. Sieyès’s response was 
to encourage individuals to delegate those burdens to others, even if this 
required relinquishing control. Representation was a ‘law of reciprocal 
commitment’; so long as all in society were committed to reciprocally 
representing others, acting through others allowed citizens ‘to do as [they] want, 
to do it better, and…with as much ease if [they] did it [them]selves’ (Sieyès 
1999.c:460).  
Sieyès was attending to the issue of commercial exchange, of which 
English commonwealthmen and their French adopters had shown suspicion. 
The individual was free in commercial society both because they were released 
from inconvenient tasks, thereby allotting free time, and because those 
inconvenient tasks would be completed to a higher standard. His intention was 
to demonstrate that, rather than supplanting virtue and liberty with private 
interests that were detrimental to the republic, commercial dependency would 
produce superior forms of liberty. Antiquated arguments of Frankish liberty 
were not only inflexible in their opposition to emergent social structures of 
commercial society; in their most malign forms, they were actively detrimental 
by entrenching the privileged order of the nobility.15  
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REPUBLICAN LIBERTY AND THE THIRD ESTATE 
If dependency was critical to individual liberty, it was also, for Sieyès, 
central to the identity of the nation, and to assessing the condition of unfreedom 
that the Third Estate found itself in. This is significant insofar as Sieyès’s 
conceptualisation of liberty was a crucial feature of his revolutionary pamphlets, 
and it allowed him to advance the cause of the Third Estate. Against both 
absolutism and its aristocratic republican opponents, he distinguished 
productive from pernicious forms of dependency, and designed a 
constitutionalism that celebrated the former and suppressed the latter.  
As Sieyès understood it, dependency manifested as a ‘vital force’ [force 
vive] generated by representative labour. This was the political chemistry for 
social unification, and so it was ‘general work’ [travail général] that was ‘the 
foundation of society’ (Sieyès 1999.b:176). The linguistic parallel with Rousseau 
was intentional, and with good reason. Representative labour was more capable 
of squaring individual liberty with collective identity without requiring anything 
so ‘oppressive’ as the civic education of the general will.16 Representative labour 
characterised the nation in accordance with his neologism ‘adunation’ (Sieyès 
1789.a:18). In keeping with its obscure ecclesiastical origins, it was analogous to 
the way in which the apostles were united around Christ to form the Church, 
and yet remained apostles in their own right (de Baecque 1996:97). This ensured 
that one remained an individual within the political community.  
This form of gesellschaft politics also allowed Sieyès to draw further 
distinctions between the three estates, and between the modes of dependency 
that governed these relations. What is the Third Estate? was prepared in the midst 
of the French public debt crisis which stretched the conventional political 
language of eighteenth-century French politics to its limits. Sieyès feared that the 
landowning First and Second Estates would choose to declare state bankruptcy 
in the face of this debt, thereby depriving creditors, primarily commoners in the 
Third Estate, of their return, while allowing the King’s ministry financial 
autonomy once more (Sonenscher 1997). Sieyès’s constitutional theory sought 
Forthcoming in European Journal of Political Theory 
13 
to disentangle decision-making from the estate structure of the ancien regime that 
would allow this. His adaptation of republican liberty was central to this 
enterprise, and to the identity of the nation that emerged from it. 
In the first chapter of What is the Third Estate?, Sieyès discussed at length 
a sociological definition of the nation. Drawing on his understanding of 
representative labour, Sieyès argued that the nation consisted of a self-sufficient 
network of commercial exchange that sought to satisfy the needs of the 
individuals therein (Sieyès 2003.c:94-95). This is because the mechanisms of 
commercial representation served as a means to hold otherwise unsociable 
individuals together in political union with one another (Hont 2005:476). Sieyès 
argued that these commercial functions were undertaken by the Third Estate, 
and that the Third Estate alone contained ‘everything needed to form a complete 
nation’ (Sieyès 2003.c:95-6). Some have argued that this entailed an ‘auto-
dialecticalisation’ of nationhood, whereby the revolutionary event actualised the 
potential nation embodied by the Third Estate (Foucault 2003:222; Mandelbaum 
2016). This interpretation has Sieyès backward, reading Sieyès through the 
revolutionary spirit of the Jacobins. Sieyès explicitly rejected this sort of ruptural 
transformation that would be felt were France to declare bankruptcy. Sieyès 
carved a reformist path that preserved the French debt and attributed it to the 
nation (Sieyès 2003.a:64-67). To do so, Sieyès applied his language of commercial 
dependency in order to think through the political reordering of the French 
nation. In untangling the expressions of dependency in pre-revolutionary 
France, Sieyès emphasised the detriment of the legalised inequality of the ancien 
regime and argued for an alternative to the estate structure.  
The dependency generated by representative labour was liberating 
insofar as it freed the individual from the time-consuming fulfilment of 
biological necessities and allowed them to divert time elsewhere. However, this 
required reciprocity, and only the Third Estate were committed to this. The First 
and Second Estates acted otherwise. The noble order, as Sieyès understood it, 
played no essential role in this commercial exchange economy. Their 
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performance of public services was nothing more than an ‘illusion’, and their 
status was defined by ‘idleness’ (Sieyès 2003.c:96-97). They had no part in the 
organisation of the nation; they were ‘a class of men who, having no function or 
any utility, nonetheless enjoy the privileges attached to their persons simply by 
dint of their existence’ (Sieyès 2003.c:97, fn.5). The noble order was a ‘burden’ 
upon the nation. The clergy was different, still. The clergy was a representative 
profession, providing a service directly to individuals. While they were 
embedded in an economy of exchange, due to historical reasons they mistakenly 
assumed themselves to be a distinct order, rather than only a profession, and 
they bestowed upon themselves a privileged status (Sieyès 2003.c:96, fn.4). 
The variegated language of dependency that Sieyès sought to identify 
had been flattened and degraded in ordinary language as the nobility had ‘so 
loudly claim[ed the language of dependency and subordination] for themselves’. 
Sieyès dismissed the fiction of the thèse nobiliaire spread by the nobility that 
contended that their subordination to and dependence upon the will of the 
government was unjust (Sieyès 2003.b:82, fn.7). Sieyès saw that the opposition 
between governors and governed formed a ‘true hierarchy’, necessary to society, 
whereas subordination among the ranks of the governed was what he took to be 
a ‘false, useless and odious’ hierarchy (Sieyès 2003.b:82, fn.7). Sieyès was intent 
to parse this language in a more careful way in his revolutionary pamphlets. Here, 
he distinguished institutional forms of dependency from commercial variants of 
symbiotic and parasitic dependency.  
 The reciprocal commitments of commercial society produced a 
symbiotic mode of dependency. This was ‘not subordination, but continual 
exchange’ (2003.b:82). Because all citizens reciprocally relinquished the 
autonomy of their will in exchange to represent another’s, Sieyès did not believe 
that there was a pernicious effect, so long as commitments were countervailed. 
This did not amount to a mechanism of oversight; it was a form of trust on the 
knowledge that a representative would cede control to another within a different 
area of competence. Perniciousness did follow from the dependency borne by 
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the noble order. In placing themselves outside the relations of reciprocal 
exchange, the nobility, Sieyès argued, were a ‘people apart’. They were: 
‘a false people that, not being able to exist by itself, since it has no 
functioning organs, attaches itself to a real nation like one of those 
parasitic forms of vegetation that live off the sap of the plants that they 
exhaust and desiccate’ (Sieyès 2003.c:97, fn.5). 
The nobility were parasitic dependents. This was not the dependency of a slave 
upon the will of a master, but the dependency of the idle on the economically 
productive. While Sieyès did not expressly use the term ‘dependency’ to capture 
this relationship, the contrast he drew with the reciprocal dependency of 
commercial exchange was plain to see. The nobility enjoyed the commerce of 
the nation while violating the principle of reciprocity that underwrote it. 
This alone only emphasised that the nobility was a fetter upon the 
productivity of the nation, which, while pernicious and exploitative, did not 
highlight a relationship of domination or subordination in either direction. The 
connection between dependency and domination coalesced when the political 
prerogatives of the privileged order were enacted. Here, Sieyès did employ the 
vocabulary of dependency in line with conventional use by the nobility. 
However, armed also with his account of commercial dependency, he did so 
with the express intention of challenging the thèse nobiliaire, and the mixed 
constitution more generally, which sought to ‘balance’ the interests of the 
competing orders. When discussing the Estates-General, Sieyès emphasised that 
the institution was to be ‘master of the decision’, and that ‘no kind of 
dependency can be allowed to be felt’ (Sieyès 2003.a:23). The Estates-General’s 
legitimacy was closely tied to the autonomy of the nation’s will, or at least the 
representation of that will through the pouvoir commettant.  What was illegitimate 
was the domination of the nation’s will by the privileged, factional interests of 
the First and Second Estates. This manifested in an acute way among the rural 
poor.  Sieyès recognised the enterprise of the nobility was to maintain their 
idleness while turning the rural peasantry against the Third Estate. The nobility, 
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in clinging to the remnants of feudalism, had successfully ensured the rural 
workers were left ‘living in dependence on the aristocracy’, and that this 
dependency ensured a ‘coalition’ between the lowest class in society and the 
privileged orders (Sieyès 2003.a:108, fn.14). The consequence of this material 
dependence was to extend the political influence of the seigneurial landowners 
into the Third Estate by way of dominating the rural peasantry. It was on this 
basis that Sieyès advocated necessary measures to counteract this influence. The 
first had been to exclude those in positions of dependency from acting as 
representatives, while also restricting the freedom of members of the Third 
Estate from electing nobles or clerics as their representatives (Sieyès 2003.c:107-
110). These were necessary, if unfortunate, courses of action in order to ensure 
that the commons’ confidence would not be usurped by the will of the noble 
order, and were necessary only until citizens could be removed from the 
dependency of the nobility and could be judged ‘eminently fit’ to uphold the 
nation’s interest (Sieyès 2003.c:109). 
Sieyès saw that the old feudal forms of dependency had not fallen away 
with the advent of commercial dependency. Instead, commercial society gave a 
new form to the parasitic dependency of the noble order, now dependent on the 
urban workers of the Third Estate. For Sieyès, commercial dependency, in either 
of its symbiotic or parasitic variants, was crucially different from feudal 
dependency insofar as they enhanced the freedom of one or both parties, rather 
than curtail it. However, so long as the parasitic dependency of the nobility 
persisted, it would prevent the withering away of the First Estate, and so feudal 
dependency was able to contaminate the political system. Domination arose 
through the remnants of the feudal system, and so in order to prevent 
domination, political representation needed to be severed from the estate 
structure of the old regime.17  This had been the basis upon which Sieyès had 
endorsed the geometric redrawing of the administrative cartography of France 
(Sieyès 1789.a). Antoine de Baecque has argued that this intended to disrupt the 
‘ancestral customs’ and ‘ethnic personalities’ of the French provinces (de 
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Baecque 1996:114). While it was Sieyès’s intention to dull the provincial esprits de 
corps in order to forge a French Nation, this was because he saw domination, in 
the form of feudal dependency, at the root of the old provincial system. Sieyès 
was clear that seigneurial offices and the bailliage system were used to conceal 
‘imperious domination’, and that their removal was key to the recovery of liberty 
in the provinces most removed from Paris (Sieyès 2003.c:107; see also 
2003.a:37). The geometric departments sought to do that by supplanting the 
traditional structures of domination in the provinces.  
If symbiotic commercial dependency was to supplant the dependency of 
the old regime, Sieyès believed it possible, even, to square representation with 
monarchy. This had been at the root of Sieyès’s disagreement with Thomas 
Paine. For Paine, monarchy was antithetical to both republicanism and 
representation insofar as it was premised upon the will of an individual 
(2003:165). This was because Paine understood liberty exhaustively in 
accordance with the commonwealth tradition, in which monarchy amounted to 
nothing more than ‘arbitrary power in an individual person; in the exercise of 
which, himself, and not the res-publica, is the object’ (Paine 1994:146).18 Sieyès 
opposed this premise, and rejected the connection Paine presupposed between 
republicanism and representation. This was a category error: while 
‘representatives’ were to be distinguished from ‘masters’, it did not follow that 
all republican governments were representative, nor that all monarchs were 
masters (Sieyès 2003.d:168-9). Rather, Sieyès understood representation and 
mastery to be attached to the two modes of commercial and feudal dependency 
respectively, and that the two forms of government might be modelled on either, 
depending upon the underlying social arrangements. The first priority, for Sieyès, 
was to address the socio-economic relations that enabled or frustrated freedom, 
and then institutional arrangements would fall in line. Within an appropriately 
representative political system, which was nothing more than an extension of 
representative labour, the monarch was not a master, but executor of the will of 
the nation.  
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While the monarch was the point of an ‘individual decision’, their power 
was tempered by the constituent and constituted powers. Sieyès referred to this 
as a ‘triangle Monarchy’, which was the ‘true bulwark of public liberty’ (Sieyès 
2003.d:171). Tuck (2016:175) has argued that this amounted to a separation of 
powers. This point requires qualification. While Sieyès had been keen to avoid 
the language of sovereignty (Rubinelli 2019.a), he did not default to the 
separation of powers as his alternative. Sieyès was dissatisfied with how a 
republican separation of powers was able to adequately address the issue of 
domination in France. Through the separation of powers, it was possible to 
maintain the estate structure and the feudal dependency that came with it. 
Moreover, constitutions that were premised upon this system of counterweights 
were precarious; they did not presuppose social unity in anything more than a 
system of property rights and this meant that none of the various bodies granted 
fullness of power need plausibly claim to represent the nation (Sieyès 2014.c:154-
57). Accordingly, Sieyès did not see his ‘triangle monarchy’ as a separation of 
powers in the conventional sense. Rather, Sieyèsian constitutionalism was 
premised on the ‘organised unity’ of ‘ascending…and descending actions’ 
between the nation and its representatives. This granted specific areas of 
competence to the respective representative organs of the nation, and through 
which they were expected to cooperate, rather than serve as competing 
counterweights (Sieyès 2014.c:154; Rubinelli 2019.b). When ordered this way, 
the constitution tempered the plenitude of power so to avoid what Sieyès 
referred to as a ‘ré-totale’ (Sieyès 2014.c:156), while also ensuring that the estate 
structure was dissolved so to prevent domination by the noble order. 
This also amounted to a reworking of citizenship, when compared to 
commonwealth-inspired arguments that emphasised the role of the landed 
nobility (Boulainvilliers 1727:50). The point was more important to Sieyès than 
is ordinarily appreciated. Manin (1997:3) argues that representation was needed 
as citizens no longer enjoyed the leisure to participate in public affairs. This 
marginalises the corollary reasoning that Sieyès emphasised, namely, that he was 
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characteristically dissatisfied with a model of citizenship that granted privileges 
to the economically idle at the cost of the productive, and so he expressly 
rejected the idea that one’s economic independence was a sufficient marker of 
citizenship. It was not enough that one was a free person. Rather, those Sieyès 
termed ‘active’ citizens were ‘stakeholder[s] in the great business of society’ 
(Sieyès 2014.a:127).19 While property was a necessary condition of citizenship, 
for Sieyès, it was not a sufficient one to indicate a stake in society. 20  Those who 
did have the leisure time that would ordinarily allow them to participate in politics 
should be excluded if that leisure was the result of their parasitic dependence on 
the labour of others. This applied to all economically idle from the nobility to 
beggars and vagabonds (Sieyès 2003.c:107). 
PETTIT, SIEYÈS AND CONSTITUENT POWER 
In On the People’s Terms, Pettit (2012:285-292) appeals to the Sieyèsian 
notion of constituent power on the understanding that it can be incorporated 
into his version of republican constitutionalism. Until now, I have sought to 
delineate Sieyès’s commercial republicanism, and to demonstrate that one target 
was a version of aristocratic French republicanism that drew on the English 
commonwealth tradition. In what remains of this paper, I argue that this diverges 
in a fine but significant way from Pettit’s formulation of republicanism: while 
Pettit appreciates the importance of trust and mutual dependence to public life, 
he relies on a mechanism of public responsiveness in order to keep this in check. 
Sieyès’s representative labour does not rely on this mechanism of public 
responsiveness; it was designed to release individuals from the need to vigilantly 
ensure their interests were being tracked. This was a key feature of his account 
of constituent power, which sought to disentangle the decision-making of the 
nation from the individuals who composed it.  
Pettit’s republicanism does not, of course, endorse what Sieyès described 
as ‘liberty of independence’. Pettit argues that non-domination is compatible 
with mutual dependence so long as interests are appropriately tracked. A 
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constitutionalism of non-domination is maintained through ‘republican civility’. 
One component of this is an ethos of vigilance to ensure lawmaking remains 
non-arbitrary (Pettit 1997:249-250). He is clear, however, that this is compatible 
with mechanisms of trust. Vigilance does not equate to the refusal of trust; if 
this were so, the condition of eternal vigilance would force citizens to forgo the 
liberty they seek to maintain. Vigilance is a form of ‘expressive’ distrust. The 
performance of trust and distrust is distinct from the implicit feeling of trust that 
one my hold of a fellow citizen or institution. There is no tension in possessing 
implicit trust, while performing expressive distrust. Pettit’s recommendation is 
that ‘whatever confidence people fee in the authorities, they will have all the 
more reason to feel such confidence if they always insist on the authorities going 
through the required hoops in order to prove themselves virtuous’ (Pettit 
1997:264). The performance of vigilance, for Pettit, is a necessary condition 
upon which trust can be underwritten, insofar as it provides a necessary safety-
check within an exchange economy.   
Sieyès’s constitutionalism differed on this fine point. Sieyès understood 
a well-ordered society to involve a trade-off between competing conceptions of 
liberty, and the prevention of domination was to be balanced against the 
condition of empowerment. Accordingly, if the gains of liberty were sufficiently 
justified, a mechanism for vigilance may readily give way (Sieyès 1999.c:477; 
2014.b:149).21 Under the system of representative labour, the gains to liberty 
from the delegation of tasks to artisans and experts were significant, and so the 
threshold at which vigilance was required to police their actions was considerably 
higher. In practice, this had important implications for the representative system 
that he designed. Political representation was an extension of representative 
labour. Sieyès was satisfied for constitution-writing to be entrusted to 
professional representatives as this disentangled the individual from politics ad 
ensured a constitution that was not the product of the whim of the multitude of 
politically disinterested individuals who comprised the nation (see Sonenscher 
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2003:xvii-xxii). Political representatives were experts charged with forming, 
rather than communicating the will of the nation. He wrote:  
‘any nation which is able to form a common will by means of 
representatives invested with authenticated powers is able to exercise 
the full extent of the legislative power’ (Sieyès 2003.a:13). 
Sieyès, of course, mitigated against the most ruinous forms of domination by 
excluding from representative offices both the nobility and the rural peasants 
dependent upon the nobility. Nevertheless, he expressly rejected theories of 
delegation that presupposed vigilant oversight of a representative’s actions. He 
took these to be ‘essentially vicious’; those ‘obliged to adhere scrupulously to the 
commission of those who mandate them’ were always at odds with establishing 
a common will (Sieyès 2003.a:11). Such politics would inevitably return to the 
estates and provinces of the ancien régime, for power would cease to emanate from 
the whole but have its origins in the respective constituencies.  
The difference between Pettit and Sieyès is rooted in the normative 
orientation that shapes how a will emanates from the nation. For Pettit non-
domination runs through each step of his argument, and so his preferred mode 
of representation is guided by ‘responsiveness’, whereby the people’s disposition 
has priority over the representatives’, and a contestatory public square provides 
the landscape from which representative draw their positions (Pettit 2012:197-
99). This was not so for Sieyès. While representatives were elected, they were 
not necessarily guided by the disposition of the nation, or any particular 
constituents within it, but were to ‘form’ that disposition. While more 
substantive than the sort of fictional attribution endorsed by Hobbes, it does not 
meet the threshold of responsiveness prescribed by Pettit. This was because 
Sieyès prioritised a mode of liberty that sought to release individuals from 
otherwise burdensome tasks.  
This was important to the Sieyèsian notion of constituent power, too. 
As Pettit presents it, constituent power features as a component within a ‘dual-
aspect’ model of democracy. In determining the metaprinciples to guide 
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lawmaking, constituent power would serve as the mechanism of vigilance 
through which the people could assess from critical distance the internal 
function of constitutional decision-making, thus serving as guardians of liberty 
(Pettit 2012:290). 22  Sieyès’ intention had not primarily been to provide a 
mechanism of critical oversight. Rather, his formulation of constituent power, 
like his account of representation, sought to ensure the political process 
proclaimed the interest of the nation without allowing the individuals comprising 
the nation from becoming entangled with politics. This was because Sieyès held 
a considerable distrust toward democracy (Quiviger 2008:238). The distinction 
between constituent and constituted powers was intended to temper the 
plenitude of power not by checking it with an equivalent power but by allocating 
the nation only the task of authorising the constitution. This intended to prevent 
the ordinary legislature from modifying the constitution, so forcing it to work 
within fixed parameters. However, this was a distinction that cut both ways: the 
constituent power had no part to play in ordinary law-making. Constituent and 
constituted powers were compartmentalised within particular spaces of 
competence. This is clearest in Sieyès’ rejection of the amendment procedure 
which would complicate the rigid distinction between constituent and 
constituted powers, in favour of a new constituent assembly (Sieyès 1789.b). 
Moreover, the people were restricted only to the ex ante selection of 
extraordinary representatives, exercising the pouvoir commettant (Sieyès 1789.c:36). 
Thus, while the nation was the nominal bearer of constituent power, it was to 
be executed by the extraordinary representatives.23 This was evident in  Sieyès’s 
decisive rejection of the imperative mandate that would subject representatives 
in the constituent assembly to public scrutiny (see Rubinelli 2019.a:59). 
Representation served as the exemplary tool to vocalise the nation’s will in such 
a way that representatives could act in the name of the constituent power whilst 
allowing the individual citizens of the French nation to live according to their 
free choice. Though a national will was necessary, its expression was not to come 
at the cost of individual non-political liberty.   
Forthcoming in European Journal of Political Theory 
23 
The restrictions that he placed on the operation of the constituent power 
intended to achieve a precise goal: to remove individuals from the political 
sphere as soon as it became viable. This had two aspects. First, in serving the 
general framework of liberty that he had constructed, the delegation of 
constitution-writing to superior representatives was suitable among a population 
that had neither the education nor time to complete these tasks themselves. 
Doing so would enhance the freedom of choice among citizens engaged in non-
political life. Second, this constitutional structure intended to attenuate the 
expressive distrust and political participation that, if it came to dominate, may 
produce a ‘ré-totale’ (Sieyès 2014.c:156). 
The precise ordering of this did change for Sieyès throughout the 
revolution. In the early years of the revolution, Sieyès did not think that vigilant 
guardianship was necessary. A well-designed constitution would be enough, and 
social relations would settle accordingly (Pasquino 2008:23). From 1795, Sieyès 
became more inclined to frame his argument for constituent power in the 
language of guardianship, professing the place of a ‘constitutional jury’ to 
safeguard the constitution (Sieyès 2014.c:159). This was, for Sieyès, a 
recalibration of constituent power in light of what he took to be its 
misappropriations during the Terror. Nevertheless, this retained the 
presumption of professional representatives, and a constitutional structure that 
kept active civic participation to a minimum (Goldoni 2012:231-232).  
This should be understood as a problem for Pettit’s account of 
republicanism. While Pettit recognises the merits of mutual dependence within 
an exchange economy and a political system premised upon this, Pettit also 
understands the notion of constituent power to serve as a mechanism of 
responsive vigilance against the forms of domination and usurpation that may 
follow from unscrutinised trust. Sieyès did not intend constituent power to 
operate in this way; rather, constituent power was an extension of the logic of 
representative labour that, for Sieyès, defined the nation, and this intended to 
disentangle ordinary citizens from political commitments. While Sieyèsian 
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constitutionalism embedded a foundational set of constrains over legislative 
action, Sieyès expected citizens to place their trust in representatives without 
recourse to the performative mechanisms of vigilance that Pettit recognises as a 
necessary guard. 
CONCLUSION 
The late 18th and 19th centuries were a crossroads for republicanism. 
Recent work has successfully excavated a set of ‘radical’ paths that republicanism 
took in this period (Gourevitch 2015; Leipold et al. 2020; Muldoon 2019). 
Republicanism fragmented in various directions, though, and this ‘radical’ 
genealogy should not delink republicanism from its liberal descendants. Many of 
the contributions of Sieyès’s constitutional theory would, in the following 
decades, be incorporated into the inchoate French liberalism, not least through 
Benjamin Constant. Even if, as Pasquino (1998) argues, Sieyès gave birth to 
modern liberal constitutionalism, Sieyès self-identified as a republican. Part of 
this paper has been an attempt to understand what Sieyès understood by that. 
Sieyès understood his republicanism to hang on an account of liberty that 
celebrated the advantages gained through reciprocal exchange. Sieyès developed 
this account of liberty in contrast with the ‘Frankish liberty’ of the thése nobiliare. 
These arguments had defended the order of nobles as guardians of Frankish 
liberty against monarchical absolutism. While Sieyès opposed absolutism, he 
rejected also the justifications that maintained the privileges of the noble order. 
His conceptualisation of liberty through representative labour allowed both to 
identify the collective identity of the Third Estate as a relation of symbiotic 
commercial dependency, and to distinguish cases of collective injustice, namely, 
the domination of the Third Estate by the privileged order within the Estates 
General, and the structural conditions that allowed the nobility to survive, 
parasitically dependent on the labour of the Third Estate. In doing so, however, 
Sieyès side-lined the arguments of civic vigilance that had been employed to 
justify the unique status of the nobility.  
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Pettit has maintained that his analytical arguments should stand 
independently from his historical excavation of a lost republicanism. My 
argument has intended to confront both components of this claim by drawing 
on the work of a figure Pettit has invoked for his cause.  Historically, the case of 
Sieyès provides further evidence against the coherence of a republican tradition 
of ‘non-domination’. Analytically, too, this is significant as the side-lining of 
vigilance should be seen as a conceptual problem for Pettit’s brand of responsive 
republicanism because Sieyès allows for a considerably higher threshold where 
political decisions can go untracked. Pettit’s interpretation of constituent power 
loses sight of the fundamental aims of Sieyès: the nation, as the abstract bearer 
of French debt, was to be the nominal authoriser of the constitution, but this 
was not intended to burden the citizens who composed it. Citizens were not to 
stand guardian over the constitution but were to release these tasks to 
professional representatives, so they might act on their non-political freedom. 
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NOTES 
1  Quentin Skinner’s favoured language for assessing republican liberty is the notion of 
‘dependency’ (1998:46; 2002:247). While preferring the language of domination, Pettit has 
accepted these terms to be interchangeable (2002:341).  
2  Pettit has recognised the stylised nature of his reading of these traditions but maintains that 
he does ‘no serious injustice’ to the figures he addresses (2013:169). 
3  This tendency persists among contemporary theorists of constituent power. See Kalyvas 
(2013:227).  
4  Recent French scholarship has placed a critical gloss on this thesis, arguing that the 
preservation of liberty takes the form of an ‘authoritarian liberalism’ (Sommerer 2017), or a 
‘conservative republicanism’ (Ayad-Bergounioux 2014). This is closely related to the position 
that I develop in this paper. On Sieyès’s ‘authoritarian’ preservation of liberty in the English 
literature, see Jainchill (2008: 197-241). A prominent exception among the contemporary 
French literature is Furet (1992:45-51) whose emphasis has not been on Sieyès’s liberalism, 
but on the radicalism of building a unity of the French nation against the privileged order.  
5  There is some precedent for this view, see Sieyès (2003.b:70). Daphne Trevor (1935:341-
342) advances an analogous reading of negative liberty in her contractarian interpretation of 
Sieyès.  
6  Sieyès’s account of deliberation in the National Assembly is mentioned in passing in Pettit 
(1997:189), while the incorporation of constituent power into republican constitutionalism 
is briefly outlined in Pettit (2012:285-92).  
7  All translations from French are my own. 
8  There is early work declaring the influence of Harrington on Sieyès. See Clapham (1912:24); 
Trevor (1935). While Sieyès showed familiarity with Harrington from as early as 1770, his 
direct influence appears to be limited to his constitutional writings after 1795, when 
Harrington had been translated into French.  
9  Sonenscher recognises Sieyès’s familiarity with Boulainvilliers in his editorial notes (Sieyès 
2003.b:177, §99). See also Chaussinard-Nogaret (1985:18-20). Sieyès listed numerous texts 
of Boulainvilliers’ in his private bibliographies (2007.a: 282-83). The two figures form a major 
thesis within Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended, each representing distinctive transformations 
in discursive fields of nationhood (Foucault 2003:140-238) On Sieyès general challenge to 
the thèse nobiliaire, see Rosanvallon (2011:12-15).   
10  On Boulainvilliers’ status as an idiosyncratic republican, and the influence of the English 
Commonwealth tradition, see Wright (2002:290-292), and Hammersley (2010:64-69). 
11  For assessments of Mably’s Des Droits, see Baker (1990:88-92), Wright (1997:70-80) and 
Hammersley (2010:89-91). An early biographer of Sieyès, Albéric Néton (1900:118), argued 
that Sieyès was an ‘ardent popularist’ of Mably. Forsyth (1987:41, 65) has identified several 
works of Mably’s catalogued by Sieyès, though remains unconvinced that he marks out a 
special influence. 
12   Most notably Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1997:114). See especially Douglass (2013). 
13  I distinguish between ‘social’ and ‘asocial’ forms of liberty as, pace Urbinati (2006:146), Sieyès 
was not drawing a distinction between positive and negative liberty, but between two 
variations of negative liberty. Both evacuated the individual of obstacles that inhibit exercise 
of the will, though they do so differently. The former isolated the individual from obligation 
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to others, whilst the later delegated responsibilities. They each result in greater space for 
individual choice, though the latter is more successful on Sieyès’s account. The positively 
framed ‘liberty of the ancients’ was excluded entirely. 
14  While their conclusions may have been developed independently from one another, it 
remains an open question whether Sieyès did diagnose this earlier, or whether he took it 
further. Smith had begun work on Wealth of Nations considerably earlier than the 1770 date 
that Sieyès claims to have made his diagnosis, while covering much of the ground of Sieyès 
in book III, chapter IV (Smith 1904:381-394). 
15  Sieyès expressed this in What is the Third Estate?, after an extended discussion of the thèse 
nobiliaire: ‘Why should not reason and justice, which may one day be motives as strong as 
vanity, press the ranks of the privileged, moved by a new, more true, and more social interest 
to seek their rehabilitation within the order of the Third Estate?’ (Sieyès 2003.b:99).  
16  For Sieyès’s characterisation of the general will as oppressive, see his discussion of a ‘ré-totale’ 
in Sieyès (2014.c:156). On the implicit contrast between the ré-totale and the republique, see 
Sonenscher (2003:xxi).  
17  Sieyès, here, was making a doubly anti-Rousseauvian point. Not only did he seek to celebrate, 
and not admonish, representation, he also sought to show that, pace Rousseau (1997:114), 
representation did not arise from feudalism. 
18  Pettit (1997:56) has cited precisely this passage from Rights of Man in order to develop his 
understanding of liberty as non-domination. On Paine’s position toward Sieyès, see Hobson 
(2008:456-460).  
19  Sieyès’s distinction between passive and active citizenship amounted to the distinction 
between the protection of one’s person and one’s property, and the right to play an active 
role in political life (Sieyès 2014.a:127). 
20  In addition to his notion of ‘active’ citizenship, Sieyès maintained two further stipulations on 
suffrage, namely property-ownership and tax contributions. Property ownership was 
necessary in order to ensure voters were not financially dependent on others (see Sieyès 
1789.c:32-33). This was analogous to the measures Sieyès implemented to address the 
dependence of the rural poor on seigneurial landowners Tax contributions endeavoured to 
ensure that the electorate held a stake in society in accordance with his propositions of active 
citizenship (Sieyès 2007.b:457-460) 
 
21  In On the People’s Terms, Pettit distinguishes between ‘invasive’ and ‘vitiating’ hindrances. 
Vitiating hindrances are those patterns in society that reduce one’s choice; invasive 
hindrances are actions that subject one to the will of another thereby denying one the chance 
to choose. Pettit (2012:40) illustrates this with the examples of denying one the option of 
reading the newspaper, thereby invading one’s choice, and print newspapers falling out of 
circulation following the uptake of electronic news sources, thereby vitiating one’s choice. 
Invasive hindrances are pernicious insofar as they are arbitrary and intended invasions of 
one’s liberty. The same agential responsibility cannot be attached to ‘vitiating’ hindrances. 
While not insignificant, Pettit takes vitiating hindrances to be secondary to invasive 
hindrances (Pettit 2012:44). Sieyès did not think vitiating hindrances should be treated as 
secondary. Poorly organised social relations could produce vitiating hindrances that were 
equally damaging as invasive hindrances. While commercial society may lead to invasion in 
some areas, it could enhance the choices available to citizens and thus guard against vitiating 
hindrances. This trade-off was an appropriate one (Sieyès 1999.c:460; 2014.b:148-49).  
 
Forthcoming in European Journal of Political Theory 
28 
 
22  This approximates, but is not identical with, early modern resistance theories of constituent 
power (see Lee 2016; Lindsay 2019). 
23  Rubinelli (2019.a:54) argues that the pouvoir constituant and pouvoir commettant should not be 
confused, as they illustrate distinctive forms of power. That the constituent power is to be 
exercised through an ex ante delegation of a pouvoir commettant, indicates that this distinction 
was only a nominal one. This allowed the constitution to be attributed to the authority of the 
nation while the delegates would exercise the real task of constructing constitutional norms. 
Sieyès was against the notion of a ratification mechanism, and on this point he was out of 
sync with many contemporaries (Tuck 2016:168). 
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